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ARE SIN AND EVIL NECESSARY FOR A REALLY
GOOD WORLD? QUESTIONS FOR
ALVIN PLANTINGA’S FELIX CULPA THEODICY
Kevin Diller

Arguably, the most philosophically nuanced defense of a Felix Culpa theodicy,
born out of serious theological reflection, is to be found in Alvin Plantinga’s
recent article entitled “Superlapsarianism, or ‘O Felix Culpa.’” In this paper I
look at Plantinga’s argument for the necessity of evil as a means to God’s far
greater ends and raise four objections to it. The arguments I give are aimed at
the theological adequacy of explaining the emergence of evil as a functional
good. I conclude that Plantinga’s Felix Culpa approach fails to demonstrate the
necessity of evil for heightened intimacy with God, and collides with agentcentered considerations. Moreover, I argue that all Felix Culpa theodicies reverse the apparent value God places on means and ends in the economy of
salvation, while lending to evil a potentially morally and theologically distorting rational legitimacy.

O Goodness infinite, Goodness immense!
That all this good of evil shall produce,
And evil turn to good; more wonderful
Than that which by creation first brought forth
Light out of darkness! Full of doubt I stand,
Whether I should repent me now of sin
By me done, and occasioned; or rejoice
Much more, that much more good thereof shall spring;
To God more glory, more good-will to Men
From God, and over wrath grace shall abound.
(Paradise Lost, xii. 469–78)1
In the words of Adam, who has been given by the Archangel a view of
God’s redemptive plans, this is the locus classicus of Milton’s expression of
the Felix Culpa, the fortunate fall or happy sin, in response to which God
brings about a greater paradise than the one lost—a
far happier place
Than this of Eden, and far happier days.2
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Its presence in Milton may serve to explain why there was discussion
of Felix Culpa theodicies in the Journal of English Literary History well
before it drew the interest of twentieth century philosophers of religion.
The Latin expression, ‘O Felix Culpa,’ has for centuries been found in an
ancient hymn incorporated into the Roman Catholic Easter Vigil liturgy,
which at length proclaims:
O assuredly necessary sin of Adam, which has been blotted out by
the death of Christ!
O fortunate fault, which has merited such and so great a Redeemer!3
In Leibnitz’s Theodicy he states,
I have shown that the ancients called Adam’s fall Felix Culpa, a happy
sin, because it had been retrieved with immense advantage by the incarnation of the Son of God, who has given to the universe something
nobler than anything that ever would have been among creatures
except for this.4
In his 1966, Evil and the God of Love, John Hick aﬃrms the blessedness of the
fall which makes possible our growth and moral transformation.5 In Paul
Helm’s 1993, The Providence of God, he endorses the Felix Culpa approach,
explaining that the fall is a ‘happy fault,’ “because it, and it alone, makes
possible the divine redemption from which the blessings of pardon and
renewal follow.”6 Arguably, however, the most philosophically nuanced
defense of a Felix Culpa theodicy, born out of serious theological reflection,
is to be found in Alvin Plantinga’s recent article entitled “Superlapsarianism, or ‘O Felix Culpa.’”7 It is this articulation of a Felix Culpa theodicy
that I wish to analyze and question. Plantinga’s thoughts warrant close
and receptive consideration as his contributions to this and other areas of
interaction between philosophy and theology are in these fields ‘towering and magnificent goods.’ In Plantinga’s presentation, he puts forward
his main argument and then handles some anticipated objections. In this
paper, I attempt to summarize the core of Plantinga’s argument and then
raise some objections both for Plantinga’s formulation and for Felix Culpa
theodicies in general.
Plantinga’s Version of the Felix Culpa Theodicy
Advocating any theodicy whatsoever is a new move for Plantinga. He has
long argued for a free-will defense but drew a clear distinction between
defense and theodicy. A defense, merely undercuts the argument that the
Christian view of God is inconsistent with the existence of evil. A theodicy
gives an answer to the question, “what is the source of the evil we find, and
why does God permit it?”8 In his 1983 “Self-Profile” right before his move
to Notre Dame, Plantinga says he has never seen a convincing theodicy
and that, “a Christian must therefore admit that he doesn’t know why God
permits the evils this world displays.”9 He appears to maintain this position right up through Warranted Christian Belief, which in fact contains in its
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closing chapter all of the elements of his Felix Culpa approach.10 His strategy here, nevertheless, is still only to defend against a potential defeater
for Christian belief. He refrains from presenting it as a theodicy. In a note
included in this final chapter of Warranted Christian Belief and referenced
again in his Felix Culpa article, Plantinga oﬀers a quotation from Abraham
Kuyper which provides some confirmation that a Felix Culpa theodicy is
(from a Dutch Reformed point of view anyway) a safe theological option.
The excerpt from Kuyper is as follows:
The angels of God have no knowledge of sin, hence also they have
no knowledge of forgiveness, hence again they have no knowledge
of that tender love that is formed from forgiveness. Nor have they
that richer knowledge of God which springs from this tenderer aﬀection. They stand as strangers in the face of it, and therefore says the
Apostle that, with respect to this mystery, the angels are, as it were,
jealously desirous ‘to look into it.’11
The key point in Kuyper, in Plantinga’s development of the argument, and
in the Easter liturgy itself is the notion that sin is necessary to achieving
God’s intended greater goods. The chaos caused by creaturely rebellion is
the unavoidable collateral damage of a project to bring about good conditions that far outweigh the losses incurred.
Plantinga’s argument progresses from a discussion of the comparative value of possible worlds. The value or disvalue of a possible world
is a calculation based on an aggregate weighting of the relative values
and disvalues of the good and bad states of aﬀairs in that world (p. 5).
Creaturely goods and creaturely evils are factored in the equation along
with all other value-measurable states of aﬀairs. There are, however, some
states of aﬀairs that are of exceedingly high value, such that the balance
of the equation is irreversibly tipped towards the positive. No amount
of creaturely evil could outweigh it. One of these states of aﬀairs is the
existence of God which single-handedly gives a world unlimited value
(p. 9). And because God is a necessary being, thus existing in all possible
worlds, there is no possible world that is not a world of unlimited value—
and therefore, “every possible world is a very good world.” It might be
interesting to think about the value of an argument that stopped there,
but Plantinga is looking for more than just a defense of God’s goodness.
“Christian philosophers should also turn to a diﬀerent task: that of understanding the evil our world displays from a Christian perspective” (p. 5,
emphasis mine).
In Plantinga’s view, although all possible worlds are such that God exists
and are therefore worlds of unlimited value, some are better than others (p.
9). There is in fact a second great-making feature of some possible worlds:
the “towering and magnificent good of divine incarnation and atonement”
(p. 9). God’s decision to become incarnate and redeem sinful creatures was
an act of free grace. There are, therefore, possible worlds in which sinful
creatures are not redeemed. Such worlds would still be very good worlds;
since, in all possible worlds, God exists. But worlds containing incarnation12
and atonement would be far better still. In fact, “any world with incarnation and atonement is a better world than any without it” (p. 10).13 Once
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again, no amount of creaturely good or evil can compare with the value of
this state of aﬀairs. Plantinga seems to suggest that its unrivaled value has
a two-fold derivation: first, and foremostly in his exposition, it is derived
from its being an unsurpassable display of love (p. 7), and second, from
the fact that it not only eﬀects salvation, but enables a greater intimacy or
fellowship with God than would have been possible without the sin and
suﬀering (pp. 18–19). The conclusion of all of this is quite obvious. In order
to have incarnation and atonement, there needs to be a state of aﬀairs for
which atonement is required. So, “a necessary condition of atonement is
sin and evil” (p. 12). Therefore we can conclude, “sin and evil is a necessary condition of the value of every really good possible world. O Felix
Culpa indeed!” (p. 12). This argument is a new species from Plantinga in
the genus of responses to the problem of evil. This is a theodicy, not merely
a defense, not merely a defeater defeater, but an explanation for why God
allows evil—a reason for evil, that does not remove all the perplexity, but
at a general level gives us an understanding for why it exists.
In addition to the theodicy, Plantinga proposes that this explanation
sheds light on other related matters. Most significantly, it shows that the
Supralapsarians were right to argue that the decree to save precedes the
decree to permit the fall. The fall was a regrettably necessary part of the
broader, and in that sense logically prior, decision to enhance the world
through incarnation and atonement.14
In the later part of his essay, Plantinga defends his proposed theodicy
against a number of objections. Possibly the most significant clarification
that comes out of his engagement is an argument for the instrumental
value of suﬀering. Suﬀering is not just a necessary byproduct of the plan
to eﬀectuate incarnation and atonement, but it also allows us to have a
kind of intimacy and solidarity with Christ that would not otherwise have
been possible (pp. 18–19).
Though Plantinga raises a number of other interesting issues in his exposition, this brief summary highlights the key features of his argument.
The great-making value of incarnation and atonement has a dual aspect,
providing both an unparalleled display of love and an enhancement to
human intimacy with God. The benefits depend on incarnation and atonement, which in turn depend on the emergence of sin and evil in the world.
Were it not for sin, therefore, this world would miss out on benefits that
incalculably surpass the costs. This leads to the conclusion: ‘O happy sin.’
Objections to Plantinga’s Version of the Felix Culpa Theodicy
1. The Towering Good of Incarnation Requires no Fall
Plantinga reasons that a world with incarnation and atonement must
contain evil, since atonement implies that there is sin that needs atoning
for. But if we consider the incarnation alone it is not clear that evil is a
prerequisite. While it may be true that atonement requires incarnation, it
is certainly not clear that a world that contains the incarnation must be a
world that contains evil and atonement. It may be argued that incarnation is a necessary part of God’s taking human suﬀering on himself, but it
is not clear that incarnation requires suﬀering,15 nor is it clear that God’s
purposes in becoming human were exhausted by those which involve
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suﬀering. Thomas Aquinas, in response to the question “whether, if man
had not sinned, God would have become incarnate?”; responds that
“even had sin not existed, God could have become incarnate.”16 To what
extent does this impact Plantinga’s argument? At no place does Plantinga
seem to hang his argument on the incarnation alone. The incarnation is
significant to the argument in that it makes more explicit one aspect of
divine condescension that contributes to the whole magnificent enactment of sacrificial love, and Christ’s human suﬀering and death would
have been impossible without it.
Plantinga is surely right to single out the incarnation as a great-making
feature of the world. But what makes the incarnation of great-making
value to the world may also have to do with its significant value outside
of the part that it plays strictly in our redemption from sin. In becoming
human God creates an opportunity for human intimacy and fellowship
with God that would not otherwise be possible. The New Testament
seems to advance the notion that, because God became human, believers are grafted together in Christ, and enabled thereby to commune with
God in a way that would otherwise have been humanly impossible. If
something like this is the case, then it is by the incarnation that we are,
“invited to join the charmed circle of the Trinity itself” (p. 18). It may not
be therefore, as Plantinga—citing Edwards—suggests, that it is primarily by virtue of our suﬀering that greater intimacy with God becomes
possible.17 Neither is it certain—following Kuyper—that this intimacy
can only be known by those once lost who experience forgiveness and
rescue. It is extremely diﬃcult to imagine what might have been, if sin
and evil had never arisen. The fact is we are those once lost who now
experience forgiveness and rescue. The story of the enactment of God’s
sacrificial love is the one in which we find ourselves and at the heart of
our worship is a reenactment and participation in the broken body and
spilled blood of our Lord. Yes, the eucharist would not be a proclamation
of Christ’s death if it had not been for sin and the atonement. But this
proclamation of his death is only “until he comes,” after which intimacy
with Christ will presumably continue and intensify. While it may be
true that in our suﬀering we are able to participate in the suﬀerings
of Christ, it does not follow that there is a unique quality and value to
this kind of intimacy or avenue to intimacy that could not otherwise be
achieved, perhaps by the incarnation alone, without suﬀering and evil.18
The body of Christ may have been given to us, without needing to be
broken for us.
I would propose that, with or without the fall, the incarnation might
serve as God’s means of drawing us into the kind of closer communion
with him that transforms us and our relationships. Additionally, incarnation alone is a towering and magnificent act of divine condescension
and self-giving, incommensurate with creaturely goods and evils. If this
is so, could a world with incarnation and no fall be just as good as world
with atonement that included suﬀering and evil?19 I mentioned that in
Plantinga’s theodicy the unrivaled value of a world with incarnation and
atonement has a two-fold derivation. The second of the two was the way
in which sin and suﬀering enable a greater intimacy or fellowship with
God than would otherwise have been possible. But this benefit of greater
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human intimacy with God may be won for us by the incarnation alone,
which in no way requires sin and evil.20
2. The Value Assumption of the Atonement and Relationship with God
If we remove from calculation any reference to the incarnation alone,
we are still left with the central and singularly suﬃcient component of
Plantinga’s theodicy. The atonement requires the fall, but the atonement
is well worth the fall. The atoning work of God in Christ is an act of such
profound and costly divine love that it stands above all other imaginable
values (p. 10) and outweighs all other creaturely disvalues. At the heart of
Plantinga’s argument is the assumption that the enactment or display of
love that we see in the atonement21 is a great-making state of aﬀairs. But
just what is it that is of such great value in a world that contains so triumphant a display of sacrificial love? We could easily here become embroiled
in a debate over the nature of love, essence and action. But the question is
worth raising; would the depths of God’s love for creation have been any
less if sin and evil had not entered the world? Surely not. In all possible
worlds God is such that he would take suﬀering and sin onto himself if that
were required for our redemption and for enabling the kind of communion
with creatures that he desires. Even in worlds without sin—if such worlds
are indeed possible—the counterfactuals of God’s love are the same.22 Perhaps Plantinga’s view is not that there would be anything lacking in God’s
love for us without atonement, but that there would be something lacking
in our perception of that love.23 It is reasonable to think that it is part of
God’s loving purposes that the beloved would understand how loved they
are. The argument, in this case, would be that the enactment of God’s love
in redemption gives us a view of the nature of that love which we would
not otherwise have had. But how could we know what God’s limitations
are with respect to communicating to us a knowledge of the depth of his
love?24 The weight of the theodicy rests on this assumption, but we are not
given a good reason to accept it.25
Another assumption that is worth probing has to do with how value
is derived in Plantinga’s calculations. In a footnote, he explains that he
avoids taking a position on whether it is “states of aﬀairs or objects or
events that are the primary locus of value; in either case states of aﬀairs
will be good or bad” (p. 5 n11). This is a helpful move, I find, but it may
still be that underlying assumptions about the primary locus of value are
operative in the comparative assessment of the values of states of aﬀairs.
For instance, in addition to objects and events, there are of course other
candidates that might serve as the primary locus of value. Perhaps we
could take a relational view. It could be that the evaluation of the states of
aﬀairs in a world W derives primarily from the kind of right relationships
that are established by God in W. If this is the case, then with respect to the
atonement, higher value will be placed on the state of aﬀairs that God accomplishes through suﬀering, rather than on the extraordinary suﬀering
itself that God endures. Assessing value in this way seems also to respect
the apparent order of means and ends in the narrative of divine grace.
That is to say, the traditional interpretation of the atonement is that it is the
means to accomplish the end of our redemption. In a Felix Culpa theodicy
means and ends are changed.26 The fall now becomes the means to the
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ultimate end of the display of God’s love in the suﬀering of the atonement.
What makes the world great on the Felix Culpa view is the towering good
of the costliness of God’s loving action, not primarily what is accomplished
by that action. If right relationship with God is the primary locus of value
for the states of aﬀairs that make a world great, then the Felix Culpa view,
it seems to me, would have little to commend it. Relationship with God
appears to be undervalued, such that it is worth severing the relationship
so that God can act out in love to restore it. In response, the Felix Culpa
defender could return to Plantinga’s suggestion, following Kuyper and
Edwards, that there is a special excellence to the quality of relationship
that can be known by those once lost who are redeemed.27 While this suggestion may resonate with some of our own experiences in an already fallen
world, grounding this claim is fraught with diﬃculties. How would we
establish the general principle without suggesting, for instance, that the
strongest marriages are those that have involved a period of divorce, or
that the deepest mother-daughter relationship is enabled once the daughter commits patricide or the like?
One might propose that any world in which God establishes a means
of right relationship between God and fellow creatures is a world that
contains a great-making state of aﬀairs that is incommensurable with
creaturely goods and evils. Evaluating states of aﬀairs in terms of their
positive or negative contribution to right relationship with God seems
to correspond better to the priorities of the gospel. The good news made
known in Christ is that God loves us so much that becoming human he
was willing to suﬀer and die to rescue us for relationship with him, not
that he loves us so much that he was willing to let that relationship be
broken in order to orchestrate an opportunity to demonstrate the depths
of his love.28 Another way to form the objection is to consider how God
himself might view the value of the atonement. If God’s purpose in atonement is to restore relationship with us, then it is proper to think that close
relationship with creation is to God of greater value than the cost of the
atonement. Restoring relationship is worth the sacrifice. The Felix Culpa
approach swaps cost and value in the equation such that the value of the
sacrifice of atonement is considered worth the cost of breaking relationship
with creation. Furthermore, this objection, it seems to me, has application
not only to Plantinga’s formulation but to all Felix Culpa theodicies.
3. Agent Centered Restrictions on Suﬀering and the Question of Supralapsarianism
A Felix Culpa theodicy maintains that a fallen world is better than one
where there is no fall. It could be asked, however, better for whom?
Plantinga argues that even if it had been within God’s power to create
a world where free people freely chose not to rebel, it would be better
to create the world where the rebellion occurred. Now, unless universalism is in view, the benefit does not appear to accrue to each agent
personally. We might grant that God would permit a person to suﬀer
for the benefit of others and the world, but would God permit someone
to suﬀer eternally because their suﬀering is an element in the best world
God can actualize?29 This seems to violate the notion of “‘agent centered
restrictions’ on the way in which a holy, just and loving God would treat
us” (p. 23). Plantinga is sympathetic to the theological conviction that
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God would ensure that in addition to whatever worldwide value is derived from the suﬀering of any particular individual there would also be
some benefit for the individual him/herself. He says, “perhaps it is also
true that he would not permit me to suﬀer for that end, an end outside
my own good, unless he could also bring good for me out of the evil.”
But if agent-specific restrictions are to be taken seriously, must they not
at least stipulate that the good which is brought out of the evil for the
individual be valuable enough to oﬀset the personal toll? However, for
Plantinga’s theodicy to be successful, he must hold that a world including all of the same people would be better oﬀ with a fall than without a
fall, even though it could not be better for those who suﬀer eternally broken relationship with God. The good of having participated in making
the world a better place would not individually oﬀset the quite personal
cost of entering hell or even being annihilated? Barring a commitment
to universalism,30 it seems once again, from this angle, that on the Felix
Culpa view the value of the extravagance of God’s sacrifice is made to be
more valuable than the right relationship with God that the sacrifice is
meant to restore.
On a related note, Plantinga maintains that one positive byproduct of
his Felix Culpa theodicy is that, “we get a clear resolution of the Supra/Infra
debate: the Supras are right” (p. 12). He casts the debate as a question about
the order of God’s decree with respect to salvation and permitting the fall.
As Louis Berkhof puts it, “the question is, whether the decrees to create
and permit the fall were means to the decree of redemption.”31 If it is the
case that God’s decree to permit sin is in fact motivated by his desire to
provide salvation, then it is his decree to save which is the more basic or
fundamental. It seems to me that theologically there is much to aﬃrm in
Plantinga’s position, particularly the priority of God’s self-giving love over
God’s decision to permit evil in the world. I have argued against Plantinga’s
notion that evil itself is necessary to fulfilling the dictates of God’s love. But
this in no way detracts from the fact that we have, in the incarnation and
the atonement, the revelation of God in the mind-blowing radicality of his
love for creatures. Furthermore, it seems altogether correct to view all that
God does, including his permitting evil and suﬀering, to be apart of and
motivated by his love. But this may also give us a reason to step back from
any traditional supra- or infralapsarianism.
The supra/infra debate was not merely about the relative priority of salvation to the fall.32 This debate was focused squarely on the nature of the
election and reprobation of individual people in God’s sovereign decree.33
Negatively, the question was about whether God actively reprobates some
(Supralapsarianism) or passively chooses not to elect some of the fallen (Infralapsarianism). The Supras held that in the logical order of God’s decree
his decision to elect some and reprobate others was primary. The Infras
held that, in the logical order of God’s decree, permitting the fall came prior
to election. God then decrees to elect some and leaves the rest in their sin.
Plantinga’s gloss on Supralapsarianism seems superior to the traditional
view because it moves the debate away from reprobation and focuses us
on the priority and great-making quality of God’s redeeming love. We are
left, however, with the unanswered agent-centered concerns. A traditional
Superlapsarian holds that what is primary for God is his decree to, “glorify
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Himself, and particularly to magnify His grace and justice in the salvation of some and the perdition of other rational creatures.”34 The question I
would raise to Plantinga’s formulation in light of this is: given the nature of
God’s personal self-sacrificing love, could the value of the world in general
actually be advanced by means of the cost of an eternally broken relationship with God for some particular individuals?
Is Theodicy a Good Idea?
These objections, I believe, have enough force to question seriously
whether, from a Christian point of view, a Felix Culpa theodicy ought to be
embraced. But does this mean that all attempts at theodicy are somehow
mistaken? Who is right, the Plantinga of 1983 who says that Christians
should admit that we don’t know why God permits evil, or the Plantinga
of the new millennium, who recommends that Christian philosophers
should turn to the task of understanding evil from a Christian perspective?
It’s possible that both are correct. Seeing evil from a Christian perspective
may bring us to the aﬃrmation that we don’t know why God permits it.
We are, it seems to me, bounded by two important convictions. First, the
world actualized by God, taken not just in its present condition but including also its eschatological consummation, is good. It must be, it is the
world actualized by the God made know to us in Jesus Christ. By his own
incarnation, obedience and suﬀering, God reverses the death and undoes
the suﬀering eﬀected by sin, such that the eschatological end outweighs
the pain and cost of permitting evil. Aﬃrming this much stops short of
making sense of evil, and for good reason. The second binding conviction
for the Christian is that evil is thoroughly evil. It is not good in evil clothing. And, therefore, evil does not make sense—it is irrational. Understanding why God might permit evil is one thing, understanding how it is that
evil emerges as something to permit is something else entirely.
A free will theodicy and a Felix Culpa theodicy can be helpfully contrasted to illumine the point. In a theodicy that explains evil as something
that arises as a result of the misuse of creaturely freedom, we are given an
explanation as to why God might permit evil, but evil itself is not made a
necessary component of achieving a higher good. Though evil might be
inevitable, we do not know that it is, because we are given no explanation
for why evil emerges in the exercise of creaturely freedom. If a good creature understands that an evil choice will distort relationship with God and
lead to death, there is no explanation possible for why a creature might
choose evil which does not already presuppose some prior evil that has
degraded in some way the proper function of that free creature’s will.35 In
Christian scripture evil is not explained, we find that it is permitted, confounded and finally eradicated.
In a Felix Culpa theodicy, evil is made a necessary component of achieving a higher good.36 This imbues evil with purpose and makes evil finally
reasonable. We now do have an explanation for evil, though we still have
no immediate explanation for how evil might emerge in the exercise of
creaturely freedom. A Molinist like Plantinga would still maintain that
God does not directly cause or commit evil. The emergence of evil remains
a mystery. But we do know that evil is intentionally and originally willed
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by God, he desires it to emerge. Unlike a free will theodicy, in a Felix Culpa
theodicy God desires evil as a means to his good purposes. This move has
a dangerously distorting moral and theological impact. We can no longer
condemn evil and injustice as wholly antithetical to what is good. Evil is
ultimately the will of God. So much so that we can say of the fall: ‘O happy
sin.’ Defenders of either theodicy may maintain that God’s hands remain
clean, creatures carry the blame for evil, evil is ultimately destroyed and
creation is redeemed. The contrast between these two theodicies is a razor’s
breadth but a chasm’s depth.37 In a free will theodicy it is the permission of
evil that is essential to the greater good that God intends, in the Felix Culpa
theodicy it is the evil itself that is essential to the greater good. Evil is made
reasonable as a functional good.38 While the goodness of God may not
be thrown into question it still creates for us moral vertigo of theological
proportions. Evil that makes sense, is no longer so bad—‘O Felix Culpa’
indeed. It seems, therefore, prudent from a Christian perspective to worry
about theodicies that attempt to explain the emergence of evil in terms of
the functional good of evil itself, rather than perhaps the functional good
of the permitting of evil. Moreover, should we not resist a theodicy which
would attempt to explain the source of the evil in a way that would make
the emergence of evil rational or sensible?
Conclusion
If I have understood Plantinga correctly, there are two aspects to the
great-making value that incarnation and atonement give a world which
outweigh the required evil and suﬀering. The first aspect is the radically
self-sacrificing display of God’s love for creatures that have rejected him.
The second is the potential for deeper intimacy with God that comes
through suﬀering or through the experience of being rescued. Against
the second aspect I advanced the argument that perhaps it is the incarnation alone which wins for us the great enhancements in the intimacy of
our relationship with God. It is not primarily our participation in Christ’s
suﬀering or experience of redemption that enables an unrivalled closeness with Christ; it is instead, the fact that the Word became flesh which
enables an unparalleled divine-human communion. But the incarnation
alone does not require suﬀering and evil, so neither then is evil required
for enhancing the intimacy of human relationship with God. If it is not
an enhancement in our relationship with God that necessitates evil, then
Plantinga’s argument stands solely on the first claim: that the value of the
atonement, which outweighs the required evil and suﬀering, is its being
an, otherwise impossible, towering display of God’s love. I have oﬀered
three challenges to this claim. First, I suggested that it is the nature of
God’s immutable love, unchanging across all possible worlds that gives
incomparable value to those worlds. Sin or no sin, all possible worlds
are such that God would have suﬀered to procure the redemption of his
creatures even in the face of their rejection of him. And, there is no reason to think that atonement is the only way God has to communicate to
his creatures the depths of his love. Second, the Felix Culpa view seems
to operate against the possibility that the locus of the value of states of
aﬀairs is derived from their contribution to right relationship with God
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and all that that entails. On the Felix Culpa view it is worth severing relationship so that God can act out in love to restore it. And third, the Felix
Culpa view treats the cost of atonement as an end rather than a means,
elevating the action of suﬀering love over God’s purpose and goal of right
relationship between God and creatures. In addition to these objections
I raised the concern that, in Plantinga’s formulation, there appears to be
an unmanageable tension between the good of a world for a particular
individual and the good of the world as a whole. If we are to take agentcentered concerns seriously it is diﬃcult to imagine a personal gain for
one who remains eternally alienated from God. And finally, I argued
from a Christian perspective against any formulation of the Felix Culpa
theodicy, because it attempts to defend God’s originally permitting evil
by turning evil into a functional good, thereby giving evil a kind of ambiguous rational legitimacy.
There is nothing ambiguous about the Christian position on evil, sin,
suﬀering, injustice and the fall. “Love does not delight in evil but rejoices
with the truth” (1 Cor. 13:4, NIV). It seems to me that the Felix Culpa defender agrees with this. What is worth rejoicing about is not the fall itself,
but what God does in response to it. What is happy is not sin, but who
God is, that he will do and has done everything that it takes to overcome
evil and give us close, personal, life-giving communion with him. What
is fortunate is that the God of all power, wisdom and love has revealed
himself to us in the incarnate Christ who suﬀered, died and rose again to
invalidate evil and suﬀering.39
University of St Andrews, St Mary’s College
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line with Paul’s ministry of suﬀering for the churches. Along with a reading of
the verse in its original word order, this recommends that we understand the
lack to refer to something lacking in Paul’s flesh as he shares in the suﬀerings
of Christ for his church. There is no indication whatsoever in the verse that
something is lacking in Christ’s atoning work.
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16. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Bros., 1947), 3.1.3 (emphasis mine). See
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17. Plantinga follows Kuyper and Edwards with the conviction that having fallen then being redeemed gives us enhanced intimacy with God. In
the previous quote from Kuyper, he suggests from 1 Peter 1:12 that unfallen
angels miss out on the depth of fellowship with God only possible for fallen
and then redeemed creatures. But are there any strong reasons to take this
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view? It seems more sensible to maintain that God’s becoming human and
not an angel is the key discriminator and suﬃcient to account for the special
depth of relationship God has with humanity. Moreover, there is no indication in 1 Peter 1:12 that the longing of the angels is a ‘jealously desirous’
longing that must go unfulfilled. The exegetical grounds for Kuyper’s position are extremely thin. Karl Barth understands 1 Peter 1:12 not to indicate
either an epistemological or relational disadvantage for angels, but simply
that angels are interested in what God is revealing, “their knowledge being
obviously dependent upon events” (CD 3.3, 499–500). I am also indebted to
Kelly Liebengood for pointing out that while angels usually announce good
news, 1 Peter 1:10-12 indicates that the revelation of Jesus Christ was given to
the church directly while angels eagerly listen in.
18. While of course we gain greatly through suﬀering and the experience
of redemption as God turns evil for our good, we should guard against the
notion that it is our suﬀering or our experience of being lost then found that
achieves for us something on its own that enhances our relationship with God.
And it is important to notice that the question of theodicy has to do with
the emergence of evil whatsoever into the world. In a world that has already
fallen, it is clear that God uses evil functionally to overcome evil. God uses evil
against itself. But when it comes to the question of why there is any evil at all,
it is a non-sequitur to leverage an explanation that already presumes the existence of evil. There is a circularity to the suggestion that the reason for God’s
actualizing a world where evil emerges is so that evil can serve the functional
good of overcoming the evil that has emerged. Plantinga’s argument is diﬀerent from this. He argues that it must be the overcoming of evil which not only
supplies the good of overcoming evil but supplies an incomparably greater
good of intimacy with God that could not be achieved by a means that did not
involve evil. My point here is that perhaps the incarnation alone, regardless of
evil, provides the ontological basis for the closest possible human fellowship
with God.
19. When speculating about the relative value of possible worlds it is important to remember that while we can purposefully entertain the theoretical
notion of possible worlds and their gradations in value, we may not be in the
right position to render an evaluative judgement. It seems highly likely that
we are not aware of the full range of constraints that limit the scope of possible
worlds. Plantinga himself seems to observe the distinction between logically
possible worlds (those in which we perceive no logical contradiction) and the
smaller subset of these worlds which are in fact possible (the kinds of worlds
God could create given all of the relevant constraints, of which we may be
mostly unaware.) If it is the case that, given who God is, God would only create a world that is in the set of the best of all possible worlds, then it would
be right to say that, on the one hand, while many worlds are possible, in that,
free from any external or logical necessity, God could have chosen to actualize
them, on the other hand, only the best worlds are possible, given who God is.
It is logically possible that this set of the best of all possible worlds is a set with
only one member. It could be that there is in fact only one possible world—the
actual world. Therefore, queries into the comparative value of logically possible worlds may in fact be irrelevant questions. When it comes to comparing
an unfallen world with incarnation to the actual world, one could argue that
there is prima facie evidence that a world with sin and suﬀering may be unbeatable by any sensible standard of measurement, it is after all the world that
the God of all wisdom and goodness choose out of all possible worlds. The
goal of a theodicy is to tell us why—a goal that is frustrated by the same human epistemic limits encountered when attempting to compare and identify
possible worlds.
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20. Aﬃrming the priority and suﬃciency of the incarnation also keeps us
from the somewhat masochistic notion that suﬀering is the place of deepest
relationship with God.
21. There is an ambiguity about the term atonement that must be carefully
navigated in this discussion. Atonement may refer to the sacrificial and costly
act whereby God eﬀects our redemption. But atonement may also refer to the
condition attained by means of that costly act (‘at-one-ment’). Or, atonement
may be taken broadly to refer to both the costly act and its consequence. A
Felix Culpa theodicy seems to say that it is the sacrificial act of atonement
which, as a demonstration of God’s love, is the great-making feature of the
world. Of course the sacrifice would not be a demonstration of love if it were
not aimed at the condition that is attained by means of that costly act. It is not
however, the condition attained by the act, but the act itself that is held to be
most valuable in the Felix Culpa view. Eﬀecting the condition of ‘at-one-ment’
does not in any obvious way entail sin, whereas the sacrificial act of atoning
for sin certainly does.
22. This is a helpful way to think about the immutability of God. No matter how the activity of God might diﬀer from one possible world to the next,
in every possible world God is such that he would do what he freely does in
any particular possible world.
23. My thanks to Alan Torrance for suggesting this interpretation of Plantinga’s argument.
24. Plantinga acknowledges this weakness in his argument and simply
proposes ignoring it: “It is hard to imagine what God could do that is in fact
comparable to incarnation and atonement; but perhaps this is just a limitation
of our imagination. But since this is so hard to imagine, I propose that we
ignore those possible worlds, if there are any, in which God does not arrange
for incarnation and atonement, but does something else of comparable excellence” (p. 10).
25. As Luke Tallon suggested to me, one could argue that by the incarnation alone God reveals that he has given himself to us. No greater gift of love
than this could be perceived.
26. It may be noted that there is some pattern resemblance between this objection and one Plantinga credits to Michael Schrynamacher under the heading: ‘Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy?’ (pp. 21–25). But the objection here
is not that a Felix Culpa theodicy has God treating people as means instead
of ends. My objection is that in a Felix Culpa theodicy the sacrifice involved
in atonement is misconstrued as an end instead of a means. The sacrifice of
the atonement is a means to the real great-making feature of the world, right
relationship with God. In no obvious way does right relationship with God
require sin and evil.
27. Perhaps, as one of the editors suggested in response to an earlier draft
of this paper, the prodigal son can have a relationship of greater value than the
son who never went astray. Of course this fails for all sorts of exegetical reasons, but most importantly the fact is that each son experiences estrangement
from the father and both would have been better oﬀ never to have turned
away from the love of the father. The fact that “he who is forgiven little, loves
little” is merely an assessment of the darkness of our hearts in our already
fallen condition. It is not grounds to assume that the fall was required to enable a depth of love otherwise unreachable.
28. There is something to the Munchausen objection—that the Felix Culpa
view makes God out to be “like a father who throws his children into the river
so that he can then heroically rescue them” (pp. 21–22). Greater value is placed
on the heroism of the rescue as a demonstration of great love than is placed on
the condition achieved by the rescue, secure and right relationship with God.
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29. This language parallels Plantinga’s usage, p. 23.
30. Accepting universalism would have massive implications for both the
problem of evil and the supra-infra debate, and for that reason it is assumed
that if universalism were considered a live option Plantinga would make more
of it.
31. Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology, Rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B.
Eerdmans, 1996), p. 119.
32. The reference Plantinga gives highlights the importance of election
(p. 1). “The terms supra and infra stipulate whether the divine decree to elect
some to salvation comes logically before or after the decrees to create and to
permit the fall.” Carl F Henry, God Who Stands and Stays (Waco, Tex.: Word
Books, 1983), p. 88. Berkhof notes that in its early form the debate was over
whether the fall was decreed or simply foreknown. It is more widely discussed
in its later form where the debate focuses on the logical order of the decree, the
nature of predestination and its personal extent, Berkhof, pp. 118–25.
33. In the first footnote of his essay Plantinga mentions the place of reprobation in the thought of Supralapsarians, (p. 1).
34. Berkhof, p. 119.
35. The garden story involves the deception of an already fallen angel, and
we are given no reasonable explanation for the fall of Satan.
36. Donald McKim’s definition is deficient in this regard. He explains
Felix Culpa as, “an expression of faith in God’s ultimate power to bring good
out of evil.” Clearly Felix Culpa directs its attention to the allegedly good and
necessary role that evil plays in God’s plans, Donald K. McKim, Westminster Dictionary of Theological Terms (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press,
1996), p. 108.
37. An expression used by Karl Barth in another context, CD I/1, 213
(“Messers Breite, aber abgrundtief,” KD I/1, 223).
38. I am not suggesting that we deny that evil is in fact used for good.
Once evil is permitted and then emerges in the world God confounds evil,
bringing good results from it. The chief example is the atonement, the suﬀering and human death of God which God uses to undo evil permanently. But
this is merely aﬃrming the triumph of God’s goodness over senseless evil, it
is not suggesting that God’s goodness needs evil in some ultimate way.
39. My thanks to Alan Torrance, Luke Tallon, Dennis Laub, Ronald Feenstra
and the editors for their critical comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

